Kobra Sangari Mohazzab; Hosein Raghfar; Mir-Hossein Mousavi; Mohammad Reza Asghari Oskoei
Abstract
I International relations are full of complexities due to their multifaceted and multilateral nature. To understand decision making processes and the payoffs of their strategies, players are enabled to utilize their capabilities to impact the strategic decision payoffs. As an example of this decision ...
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I International relations are full of complexities due to their multifaceted and multilateral nature. To understand decision making processes and the payoffs of their strategies, players are enabled to utilize their capabilities to impact the strategic decision payoffs. As an example of this decision structure we can refer to the international disputes and conflicts including the sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s interests in international arena have been influenced by the changing interests of the other stakeholders in the coalition of the United States sanction against Iran. In order to analyze and predict the equilibriums of the players positions in the complex international space of the sanctions, game theory, mechanism design, multi-agent systems, and artificial intelligent as new instruments of decision theory are utilized to resolve the transactions and processes influenced by the human decisions. In this research, a policy spectrum is defined according to the strategies of Iran, the United States of America and other stakeholder’s countries. Modeling and simulating the behavior of players on this continuous spectrum which includes two extremes of capitulation and confrontation shows that in the current situation, Iran’s equilibrium and dominated strategy is emphasizing the maintenance of the current agreement in JCPOA, although this position is in the lower range of the spectrum of the current agreement. In these sanctions there is a possibility of a tragedy of the commons. In order to prevent its occurrence, the results of this study imply that the dominant strategy, given that all the players are rational, is to preserve stability, security, and integrity of Iran as a regional power. In order to achieve a stable equilibrium of the game, the stakeholders try to maximize the social welfare function instead of individual participants’ payoff. The rational strategy of Iran is to stay in JCPOA, strengthening political ties with the European players, and to empower its own military and social securities.
saeed moshiri; Habib Morovat; Farhad Fallahi; Mohammad Reza Asghari Oskoei; Meisam Doustizadeh
Abstract
We develop an agent-based model to study the effects of the electricity market reform on the electricity prices, the power plants’ technology mix as well as their capacity utilization and profits. The reform’s main objective is to open the electricity market to more competition and increase ...
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We develop an agent-based model to study the effects of the electricity market reform on the electricity prices, the power plants’ technology mix as well as their capacity utilization and profits. The reform’s main objective is to open the electricity market to more competition and increase the efficiency. The new wholesale electricity market will operate based on the one-day-ahead auctions organized by the independent system operator. We set up two scenarios in which the market clearing mechanism changes from the pay-as-bid to market clearing price (MCP) and the fuel subsidy to power plants will be removed. The effects of the two scenarios will be analyzed on the market prices, plant revenues, market shares, and power generating units’ capacities. The simulation results show that the electricity prices are higher during the peak load mainly due to the entry of the higher cost plants during those periods. Electricity prices are lower under the MCP scenario and higher under the fuel subsidy removal scenario, leading to lower and higher revenues for the power plants, respectively. The results also indicate that the market shares and the capacity utilization of the more efficient plants will increase under both scenarios.
